The generals in Brittany prevented the rural armed groups
from coalescing and taking control of the region. At the end of April 1793
republican control had been re-established, despite the fact that those
opposing it remained in general totally hidden, sometimes concealed
underground, most often in wooded areas or isolated villages, benefiting from
the support of the peasants, whether voluntary or forced. A certain number of
Bretons or insurgents from Maine and Anjou traveled to the south of the Loire,
joining one of the Catholic armies being set up. After July 1793 complex
confrontations between Girondins and Montagnards split the revolutionary camp
even further: some of the defeated Girondins defected to the
counter-revolution, the most famous of these being Puisaye, who entered into
negotiations with various groups of resisters and succeeded in being named
general-in-chief of the chouans at the end of the year (Hutt 1983). In the
meantime, the name chouans was applied to all of them, giving general
application to a nickname originally relating to bands of smugglers who
imitated the call of the owl.
The arrival across the Loire of Vendéans heading for
Granville after October 1793 changed the situation. The chouans rallied and
joined in the battles before going back into hiding once the
counter-revolutionaries had been repelled. But the arrival of the Vendéans
upset the regional balance to the benefit of the chouans, who were freed from
the pressure of the republican troops they had been fighting and which were
redirected against the Vendéan column. Moreover, even though the Vendéans had
been crushed, the republican armies emerged greatly weakened by a succession of
battles. By the beginning of 1794 the republicans held the towns, main roads,
and those parts of the countryside where the locals had stayed faithful to the
Revolution. But several informal groups of chouans established themselves here
and there along the coast of Brittany as far as the south of Caen, to the east
of Le Mans and Angers. The leaders, mostly commoners identified by their peers
and thereafter recognized for the leadership they had demonstrated in combat,
had established fairly strong links. The factions that had developed within the
revolutionaries and the exhaustion of their armies led to a certain stasis,
confirmed by the peacemaking efforts of a few representatives on the spot,
notably in Rennes. During the autumn of 1794, insurgents stopped being referred
to as "bandits" and became once again "misguided brothers,"
who might be pardoned if they agreed to lay down their arms. The process, as in
Charette's Vendée, ended with a peace treaty between the chouan general
Cormatin and the Republic, signed at Mabilais, not far from Rennes, in April
1795. But, as in the Vendée, where the counter-revolutionaries had split over
this point, some chouans, of whom the best known is Cadoudal, the powerful
leader from the Morbihan, rejected any peace deal.
But peace did not last there either. It served only to allow
preparations for fresh battles, with the chouans benefiting from direct aid
from the English and from the gratitude of the émigré princes, thanks to
Puisaye, who had gone to England. This support, which the Vendéans had lacked,
benefited the chouans, but transformed the movement by placing it under the de
facto control of the nobles wanting to conduct a war in France against the
Revolution and who saw an opportunity to regain their power and prestige. The
limitations of this new situation became obvious as early as July 1795, when
the émigrés and soldiers who had landed from English ships in the bay of
Quiberon were defeated, imprisoned, and shot by troops commanded by Hoche. Bad
relations between the expedition leaders and the difficulty of commanding
peasant armies unused to any form of military discipline led to a resounding
defeat of the whole undertaking. While Brittany had mostly escaped the
Republican ascendancy, the failure of the landing at Quiberon had catastrophic
consequences. The radical counter-revolution seemed incapable of changing the
balance between the armies. The comte d'Artois spent two months off the Ile
d'Yeu before landing in France. His abnegation was not merely tactical: the
Paris uprising was crushed, the royalist networks dismantled or weakened, and
the strategy of the constitutional monarchists was henceforth to take power
through the electoral process.
Thus between 1796 and the summer of 1797 a period of
indecision over the fate of the armies ensued. Chouannerie, however dangerous,
was not accorded the same priority as the Vendée. It needed only to be
contained; it did not endanger the republican state, which had more to fear
from enemies on its borders and the possible alliances of royalists in the
southwest of the country. In Brittany and Normandy armed groups were crossing
the countryside engaging in surprise attacks or individual assaults and were
frequently assisted, notably in Normandy, by poor people driven by destitution.
Young noblemen joined these groups, helped by links with England which had
become entrenched via the Channel Islands. Facing them, republicans watched,
organized, and repressed, sometimes barely within the limits of the law, as
"counter-chouans" undertook what were real commando operations. A
state of general insecurity reigned. Assassinations and the settling of old
scores occurred, as well as executions of political opponents. The inhabitants
were subjected to the passage of opposing troops and were themselves committed
to one camp or the other. However, the local administrative framework was often
respected, even if it was difficult to find municipal officials to appoint or
to know whether some were covert royalists. Taxes were poorly collected and the
presence of armed forces was indispensable, but extending the conflict to the
rest of the country was unthinkable, and the moderate royalists who were
competing with the republicans were not inclined to support the chouans and
their noble leaders who wanted to return France to a bygone era (see the
case-study in Bourgeon 1986).
After 1797, and the failure of the attempt by constitutional
monarchists and conservative republicans to take power, the position of the
radical counter-revolutionaries was strengthened. The chouans became a sort of
shadow army, with a general staff in which nobles played a greater part, even
if the established leaders, such as Cadoudal, remained in place. The chouan
leaders, Bourmont, d'Andigné, Scépeaux, and Frotté, led henceforth an organized
and hierarchical guerrilla war, with a more or less stable body of troops,
depending on safe chateaux or forests, with arms and money from England. When
needed, the nebulous chouannerie hidden within the peasantry could always be
mobilized. The links with the émigrés, England, and the king thus give
chouannerie its ideological importance, especially as networks of secret agents
were criss-crossing France and preparing to retake the country by force of
arms. The political aim of chouannerie is clear: the movement was participating
in the counter-revolution in order to restore a monarchical, Catholic, and
seigneurial state, in other words, essentially France as it was before 1787.
This militarization reached its peak in 1799, linked to the
great offensive launched against the Republic by the coalition. On every front
- Italian, Dutch, Swiss, German - armies were engaged in significant
operations. In the west, war resumed after overt preparation by the chouan
leaders, who rallied their troops and organized their offensive operations by
placing whole regions under military control. The counter-revolutionary
offensive was, however, brought up short; there was no similarity in outcome
between different theaters of war and, while Italy had virtually rid itself of
French republicans, the latter were fighting to the death in Switzerland,
defeating the Anglo-Russians in the Netherlands and had scattered the thousands
of men who had laid siege to Toulouse.
In October 1799, the chouans succeeded in seizing a few
towns in the west (Le Mans, Saint-Brieuc, and Nantes) before falling back to
their preferred territory. The armies that had been raised to the south of the
Loire had not been victorious, confirming the military defeat of the Vendée.
Bonaparte, as soon as he was made Consul, opened negotiations with the chouan
leaders, granted freedom of worship, made contact with Stofflet's former
secretary, the abbé Bernier, in order to prepare the Concordat, and tried to
win over the chouan leaders, by force or persuasion. Cadoudal resisted but left
France for the time being; Frotté was taken and shot as a general warning; and
others fell into line sporadically. The glory days of chouannerie were at an
end.
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