Seven year old Louis in 1792, portrait by Alexander Kucharsky
The Legislative Assembly met in an
atmosphere of international crisis. For the first time since 1787, the flight
to Varennes had made French affairs a subject of concern rather than disdainful
satisfaction to foreign powers. In May 1790 the Constituent Assembly had
positively renounced war as an instrument of policy, except in self-defence.
But after the ignominious recapture of a king who appeared bent on
internationalizing his plight, other monarchs were alarmed. In the Declaration
of Pillnitz (27 August 1791) the Emperor and the king of Prussia were induced
by Louis XVI's two émigré brothers, Artois and Provence, to threaten military
intervention. Thousands of army officers had joined the émigrés after Varennes,
and were now massing across the frontier dreaming of a return with foreign
armies.
Louis's brother, the comte de Provence, who
had escaped to Belgium, had early in July joined the comte d'Artois and
Gustavus III of Sweden at Aix-la-Chapelle. Here the emigres made noisy and
threatening preparations for an early restoration of the ancien regime in France
by force of arms. With Provence claiming to be regent of France as of right,
with Conde's forces at Worms swollen by mass desertions of officers from the
frontier regiments, these threats no doubt seemed more serious to the French
Assembly than they were in fact.
The king and queen shared these dreams; but
the new deputies saw them as a provocation. Over the autumn and winter their
language became hysterically belligerent towards the German princelings who
harboured the émigrés and, behind them, the Habsburg Emperor. They also sought
to provoke Louis XVI into compromising himself by passing decrees intensifying
penalties against refractory priests and émigrés which they knew he would not
sanction. General paranoia was intensified by news of a massive slave uprising
in the Caribbean, and the coffee and sugar shortages that followed. Despite
fears, evinced by Jacobins like Robespierre, that the debilitated army was in
no state to defeat the disciplined forces of Austria and Prussia, most of the
country was carried away by war fever.
Though it was recognised that the emigres
congregated at Worms and Coblenz offered only a potential military threat to
the country's security, it was against these enemies rather than against
emigres in general that action was directed. Other reasons, however, lay behind
the decree. There was, for example, the practical problem of filling the twelve
hundred commissions in the army vacated by the emigration of royalist officers.
Nor could the Assembly ignore the need to check the flight of emigre revenues
from France at a time when the assignats were beginning to depreciate. The
decree of 9 November imposed on all emigres who had joined the armed
concentrations outside French frontiers and who failed to repatriate themselves
by 1 January 1792 the penalties of treason-confiscation of their property and
capital punishment if caught.
The king (who shared Robespierre's analysis
but saw it as a sign of hope for his own rescue) was therefore happy to declare
war on the Emperor on 20 April 1792.
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Serious talk was also heard in the spring
of 1795 of restoring monarchy in the person of Louis XVI's surviving son, a
sickly child who might be made acceptable by a carefully controlled,
public-spirited education. These hopes, however, were destroyed in June 1795
when `Louis XVII' died; and from his exile in Verona the next month, his uncle
the Count de Provence proclaimed his own succession as Louis XVIII in a
chillingly uncompromising declaration which promised an almost total
restoration of the old regime in the event of his return. That obviously meant
giving back national lands to the Church and to émigrés who had incurred
confiscation once war broke out. Some émigrés chose this moment to demonstrate
their continued intransigence by attempting to invade Brittany with British
support in the hope of marching on Paris at the head of a horde of Breton
Royalists. They never got beyond the beaches at Quiberon and were shot in their
hundreds by their republican captors.
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Just as patriotism provided common ground
between the emigres and their expropriators, so too did historical determinism.
The exiles were haunted by the idea that the Revolution was a work of
Providence, or of Fate-call it what you will so long as eternity is invoked to
provide miscalculation with its alibi. They were not, however, the only ones
who had miscalculated, nor was a mystical conservative fatalism the only kind
of determinism. As the Revolution went on, it assumed unforeseen and terrifying
forms, yet all the while continued to interweave itself with the belief in
progress; it shed layer after layer of its supporters, while making its cause
more and more inseparable from the whole national interest. It thus encouraged
men to hypostasise events which they failed to understand or which they did not
know how to resist, until confusion appeared an organic unity, an ineluctable
process. Given certain data, said Toulongeon, revolutions, like physical changes
in the material of the universe, are inevitable. Napoleon, with that unfailing
realism by which he measured everything except his own ambitions, saw this
tendency as the historical formula to reconcile all Frenchmen. In his now
notorious historiographical instructions to the Abbe Halma (1808) he
recommended an unemotional approach to the horrors of recent years-'the blame
attaches neither to those who have perished nor to those who have survived.
There was no individual force capable of changing the elements or of foreseeing
the events which were born from circumstances and the very nature of things.'
Had the emperor written revolutionary history instead of regarding it as a
prelude to his legend, he would have spoken with the accents of Thiers and Mignet.
These two historians were to be accused of 'fatalism'. It was not their
invention. The victor was glad to have 'the very nature of things' legitimising
his rule, as it had necessitated the Terror: the defeated were glad to have
succumbed to no lesser foe than destiny.
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